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Abstract 
 
Some New Zealand local authorities elect to provide financial information on their websites. 
Literature examining the behaviour of managers in the public sector suggests that agency 
relationships in the sector motivate such managers to provide information to enable the 
monitoring of their actions. This literature identifies a number of characteristics and variables 
that proxy for agency costs in the public sector. The recent development of the Internet 
provides an opportunity for examining voluntary disclosure in the public sector and, in 
particular, in the local government environment. This paper examines the voluntary Internet 
financial reporting practices of local authorities. Five variables associated with voluntary 
disclosure - size, type of local authority, profitability (surplus), leverage and press visibility - 
are examined. The results of the univariate analysis indicate that size, council type, and press 
visibility are associated with local authorities’ choice to report financial information on the 
Internet. However, the results of multivariate analysis indicate that only size and type of 
council are associated with the quantity and type of financial disclosure on the Internet. 
Possible limitations of the study and suggestions for future research are discussed in the 
paper. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the characteristics of local authorities that influence the voluntary 
dissemination of financial information on the Internet. Such examination enhances the 
understanding of the incentives for the use of the Internet as a medium for discretionary 
disclosure in the public sector. All 86 local authorities in New Zealand are included in this 
study.  
 
Using various models such as agency and signalling theories, extensive literature examines 
the determinants and characteristics associated with discretionary disclosure practices by 
business enterprises.1 Some literature examines the determinants of discretionary disclosure in 
the public (government) sector and identifies distinctive managerial incentives that motivate 
various disclosure practices (e.g., Baber, 1983; Christiaens, 1991; Evans and Patton, 1987; 
Ingram, 1984; Zimmerman, 1977). 
 
In the early 1990s, as part of the reform of public sector financial reporting, public sector 
entities' financial reporting in New Zealand was aligned with private sector financial 
reporting. Public sector entities prepare their financial statements in accordance with the same 
set of financial reporting standards that apply to private sector entities.2 The Local 
Government Act 1974 (sections 223D and 223E) requires local authorities to prepare two 
financial reports, an annual report and an annual plan. The annual report provides historical 
financial information while the annual plan provides forward-looking financial information. 
The Act requires local authorities to send copies of their annual reports and plans to the 
secretary of local government, the auditor general and parliamentary library. Local authorities 
are also required to make their annual reports and plans available for public inspection in their 
offices and libraries and make copies of such reports available to the public either free of 
charge or at a reasonable charge. Some local authorities elect to use the Internet to publish 
                                                     
1 Cerf’s (1961) empirical study of factors influencing the adequacy of US corporate annual report disclosure 
appears to have been a major catalyst for this stream of research. Subsequent studies have examined corporate 
voluntary disclosure in a variety of settings, such as India (Singhvi, 1968; Marston and Robson, 1997), Japan 
(Cooke, 1991, 1992, 1993), Mexico (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987), New Zealand (McNally et al., 1982; 
Wong, 1988; Bradbury, 1992; Hossain et al., 1995), Sweden (Cooke, 1989a, 1989b), UK (Firth, 1979), and 
USA (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Malone et al., 1993). Determinants that have frequently been 
examined include firm size, profitability, leverage, listing status, industry, and audit firm size. For a recent 
review of this literature, see Ahmed and Courtis (1999). 
2  Public Finance Act 1989 requires that the Crown, Crown entities and agencies, and departments prepare their 
accounts in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice. An amendment to the Local Government 
Act 1974 in 1989 requires that audited financial statements of local authorities be prepared in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting practice. 
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their annual reports and plans. Some also provide, on the Internet, additional or selected 
financial information in the form of financial highlights. This study investigates the possible 
influence of five key determinants on New Zealand local authorities’ voluntary disclosure of 
financial information on the Internet  
 
The use of the Internet as a medium for the dissemination of financial information by local 
authorities is discretionary. A number of studies examine the determinants of discretionary 
financial reporting on the Internet by business enterprises (e.g., Craven and Marston, 1999; 
Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999). These studies primarily focus on 
managerial incentives in the private sector. The determinants of such discretionary disclosure 
in the public sector have not been examined. If local authority characteristics are associated 
with the incentives of disclosing private information, then these should be considered when 
evaluating the need for regulation of Internet disclosures by public sector entities. This study 
provides evidence which would be useful for legislators and accounting regulators. 
 
To investigate why managers of local authorities elect to provide financial information on the 
Internet, this study compares the characteristics of local authorities that elect to use the 
Internet as a disclosure medium with the other local authorities that elect not to use such a 
medium. The results indicate that size and council type are the primary determinants of the 
disclosure of financial information on the Internet. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The following section reviews the literature on 
determinants of financial reporting practices in the public sector. Section 3 presents the 
research hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the research design. Data analysis and discussion are 
provided in Section 5. Summary and conclusion is the last section. 
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2.  Literature Review 
 
The literature examining voluntary disclosure in the government sector is largely based on the 
application of agency theory in that sector. The following is a review of literature on agency 
relationships and determinants of voluntary disclosure in the public sector. 
 
2.1  Agency Relationships and the Incentives for Disclosure in the Public 
Sector 
 
The relationships in business enterprises between managers, owners, and creditors are referred 
to as agency relationships. Similarly, the relationship between the political (public sector) 
manager and the voter can be described as an agency relationship whereby the voter is the 
principal and the political manager is the agent (Banker and Patton, 1987). In this scenario, 
politicians are assumed to be self-interested, maximising agents, whereby the maximisation of 
their wealth depends on re-election, advancement, and current and future income, both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary (Zimmerman, 1977). Zimmerman notes that the interest of the 
agents and the principal can differ in several ways: the agents can shirk, consume perquisites, 
or engage in illegal acts. In addition, political managers, in the pursuit of achieving a higher 
office, can use the resources of the office to further their careers (McKean, 1964). For 
example the politician may sponsor strong environmental protection legislation to establish 
credibility as an environmentalist. They can also enter into informal contracts that trade 
current legislation for future support (Zimmerman, 1977). Furthermore, they can devise ways 
to use the relatively low cost (sometimes free) media exposure to “create” and “solve” a 
“political crisis” in order to make them more popular (Jensen 1976: cited from Zimmerman, 
1977). These activities give the voters (as the politicians principals) incentives to monitor the 
behaviour of the politicians. 
 
Within this framework, voters are also being assumed to be self-interested and to act in such a 
way as to increase their wealth. Voters’ wealth is related to the actions of their agents, directly 
through the politicians’ power to levy taxes and their power to determine the mix and the 
quality of services provided to the voters (as citizens) and indirectly through the effect of 
property taxes on property value (Zimmerman, 1977). Zimmerman states that though the 
contractual claims and benefits-sharing among the voters are not homogenous, each voter has 
an incentive to monitor the behaviour of the politicians; such as to reduce the outright theft 
and embezzlement and to monitor the level of perquisites consumed by the agent. 
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However, the voters are assumed to be rational and act only when the expected benefit exceed 
the expected cost of the action (Baber, 1983). Baber notes that although the potential benefit 
of electing an agent that favours the interest of the voter can be significant, the probability that 
a single voter can influence the outcome of an election is very small. Therefore, the expected 
benefits of becoming informed of the politicians’ intentions and how they will affect the voter 
are relatively insignificant, whereas the cost of obtaining such information would be 
substantial (Baber, 1983). Hence most voters lack pecuniary incentive to acquire information 
to improve their voting decision (Downs, 1957: cited from Baber 1983). The voters tend to 
rely on intermediaries, called interest groups, who can affect the outcome of elections by 
distributing information that favours or disfavour candidates. Since interest groups have the 
power to influence the outcome of elections, they have an incentive to gather information 
about the behaviour and actions of the politicians (Baber, 1983). If the politicians wish to be 
elected, they could not afford to dismiss the interests of these groups, and hence the 
politicians advocate policies that appeal to these groups. 
 
Similar to other agency relationships, in this scenario, the interest group (the principal) and 
the politician (the agent in the public sector) share certain benefits and also certain costs. 
Therefore the elected politicians supply monitoring information to show that they are in fact 
honouring the pre-election promises, and their incentives to do so increases as political 
competition increases (Baber, 1983). 
 
The discussion above indicates that agency relationships in the public sector provide 
incentives to public sector managers to voluntarily disclose information that the allows the 
monitoring of their actions. A number of studies examine the voluntary disclosure of 
managers in the public sector. These studies are reviewed in the following section. 
 
2.2  Incentives for Voluntary Disclosure in the Public Sector 
 
Relative to the private sector, studies examining voluntary disclosure practices in the public 
sector are limited. Zimmerman’s (1977) study is one of the earliest to examine the possible 
economic incentives for accounting policy choice by local governments. He proposes a 
number of economic incentives that influence the shape of municipal accounting systems. 
Evans and Patton (1983, 1987) identify economic incentives that lead cities to participate in 
the Government Finance Officers Association Certificate of Conformance Program. Ingram 
(1984) examines the association between economic determinants and the cross-sectional 
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variations in disclosure by US state governments, while Ingram and DeJong (1987) and 
Giroux (1989) examine reasons for variations in disclosure by US cities. 
 
Studies examining economic determinants of financial reporting in the public sector are 
motivated by various objectives. Such objectives include providing a positive theory of local 
authorities disclosure practices (e.g. Zimmerman, 1977), explaining cross-sectional 
differences in accounting policy choices employed by local authorities (e.g. Christiaens, 1991; 
Ingram, 1984), and understanding the effects of reform and changes within government 
accounting systems (e.g. Christiaens, 1991).  
 
Similar to studies examining voluntary disclosure in the private sector, a variety of theoretical 
arguments and frameworks such as agency costs, political costs, signalling and monitoring, 
and information asymmetry are employed by the researchers examining financial reporting in 
the public sector.  
 
The literature identifies a range of potential disclosure incentives in the local authorities’ 
environment. A summary of the major studies in the public sector is presented in Table 1. The 
following is a review of the various disclosure incentives examined in the literature.  
 
Baber (1983) argues that the higher the political competition the higher the incentive for the 
political manager to supply monitoring information to the principals. Several studies have 
empirically tested this relationship (e.g. Ingram, 1984; Baber 1983; Baber and Sen, 1984; 
Evans and Patton, 1987). Most of these studies show a positive relationship between political 
competition and disclosure (e.g. Ingram, 1984; Baber 1983; Baber and Sen, 1984).  
 
Several studies have examined the relationship between the form of local government (the 
chief operating officer is an elected mayor or a city manager) and monitoring incentives (e.g. 
Zimmerman 1977; Evans and Patton, 1987; Ingram and DeJong, 1987). Generally, these 
studies reveal a significant relationship between form of local government and disclosure 
choice.  
 
Based on political theory, Baber (1983) suggests that size is related to both monitoring and 
political competition (see for example Stigler, 1976). A number of studies examine the 
association between size and monitoring behaviour (e.g., Evans and Patton, 1987; Ingram and 
DeJong, 1987; Ingram, 1984; Baber, 1983; and Christiaens, 1991). It appears the evidence 
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relating to the association between size and monitoring behaviour is inconclusive. Ingram 
(1984) and Evans and Patton (1987) report no statistical association while Baber (1983), 
Ingram and DeJong (1987), and Christiaens (1991) show a significant relationship between 
size and monitoring behaviour.  
 
Zimmerman (1977) argues that politicians have incentives to reduce cost of debt thus 
increasing the resources available for other programs that may increase the politician’s 
welfare. Such incentives motivate public sector managers to provide information for the 
monitoring of their actions. The results of studies that examined the relation between debt and 
monitoring behaviour of local authorities are mixed. For example, Ingram and DeJong (1987) 
and Evans and Patton (1987) report significant relationship between debt and disclosure while 
Baber (1983), Baber and Sen (1984) and Christiaens (1991) find that debt is not associated 
with disclosure. 
 
Zimmerman (1977) notes that the press and public media is involved in the agency 
relationship between voters and politicians. He points out that the “uncovering of political 
graft and scandals sells newspaper, attracts television viewers and radio listeners, and 
therefore affects the advertising rate.” However, if there is a demand facing the media to 
provide entertainment rather than provide information, certain news items may become more 
valuable (e.g. embezzlement and sex scandals) than uncovering shirking or the politicians’ 
perquisites derived from vote trading. Hence, the monitoring provided by the press does not 
ensure that the political agent will act in the best interest of his voters, but rather only that 
certain forms of behaviour will be monitored more closely then others. The positive 
relationship between the press and disclosure is not supported in Ingram’s (1984) study that 
finds a negative relationship between newspaper circulation and disclosure quality of financial 
reports. One explanation given was that the surrogate used may not be an effective proxy for 
the strength of the press, suggesting that the indirect relation was spurious.  
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3. Hypotheses 
 
This section develops the study’s hypotheses relating to the factors expected to affect New 
Zealand local authorities’ discretionary use of the Internet for financial reporting.  It draws 
heavily on the literature and theory overviewed in the preceding section.  In particular, it 
assumes that all individuals (i.e., voters, local political managers, creditors, and members of 
the press) are rational, evaluative, maximising individuals, and that local authorities can be 
depicted as a series of complex agency relationships.  The study does not attempt to model in 
detail all possible agency relationships pertaining to local authority entities.  Instead, it 
focuses on those that the researchers believe are most relevant to a discussion of external 
financial reporting on the Internet. 
 
3.1 Local Authorities in New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand there are two principal forms of local authority, regional councils and 
territorial authorities.  Territorial authorities are either district or city councils.  Regional 
councils are responsible for resource management, bio-security, catchment control, harbour 
administration, regional civil defence, and regional land transport. City and district councils 
are responsible for community well-being and development, environmental health and safety 
(including building control, civil defence, and environmental health matters), infrastructure 
(roads and transport, sewerage, water/stormwater), recreation and culture, and resource 
management including land use planning and development control. 
 
Eligible voters are entitled to vote for councillors and, in the case of territorial authorities, a 
mayor.  The council appoints a chief executive officer (CEO) to whom heads of departments 
within the council are responsible.  Under the Local Government Act 1974, the CEO (city 
manager) is charged with the responsibility for implementing decisions of the council, 
providing advice to council, and ensuring effective, efficient and economical management of 
the activities and planning of the local authority. 
 
Over the last decade local government has become increasingly independent of central 
government.  Central government has simultaneously devolved certain responsibilities to 
them, and reduced the extent of financial assistance and subsidies.  The Economic and Social 
Commission of Asia and the Pacific (2001) estimates that 90 per cent of New Zealand local 
government funding is now locally sourced.  Corresponding accountability is achieved 
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through the requirement of local authorities to engage in a consultative planning process, the 
publication and dissemination of an annual plan and an audited annual report; and the 
requirement that local authorities develop, implement, and maintain long-term financial 
strategies, together with investment and borrowing policies.  Despite the largely autonomous 
nature of local government, the Minister of Local Government has the power to appoint a 
review authority to review a specific council where the Minister believes that there has been a 
significant and identifiable failure of governance (e.g., mismanagement of resources or 
deficiencies in the management or decision-making processes of the authority). 
 
The four main sources of income for New Zealand councils are rates, grants from central 
government, income from user charges, and loans.  Nowadays, the only kind of subsidy from 
central government is for roading construction and maintenance.  Many of the restrictions on 
local authority borrowing have been removed with the passing of the Local Government 
Amendment Act 1996 (No. 3). 
 
A number of agency relationships can be identified in the New Zealand local authority setting, 
and include relationships between: 
 
voters (and interest groups) and local political managers, 
creditors and local political managers, 
central government bureaucrats and local political managers, and 
council and appointed local political managers 
 
3.2  Disclosure Incentives: Council Size 
 
Baber (1983) argues that the number and magnitude of wealth transfers administered by 
political agents may increase competition for public office.  Increasing political competition 
makes it more costly for incumbent political agents to ignore pre-election agreements with 
supporting voters (or interest groups), so political agents have an incentive to bear greater 
monitoring costs by supplying more information which demonstrate their execution of pre-
election promises (Baber, 1983).  The Internet is likely to be a cost effective means of 
satisfying the political manager’s voluntary disclosure incentives as the cost of information 
production and dissemination on the Internet is likely to be largely unrelated to council size 
(Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999).  As a consequence, the benefits of disclosure over the 
Internet are likely to be increasing with size.  The first hypothesis (in alternate form), then, is: 
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H1:  There is a positive association between local authority size and the voluntary 
use of Internet financial reporting. 
 
3.3  Disclosure Incentives: Leverage 
 
The use of debt to finance public activities has been argued to promote an incentive for 
political managers to reduce the cost of debt. This may be achieved through the voluntary 
disclosure of information that facilitates monitoring by creditors (Zimmerman, 1977; Baber, 
1983; Baber and Sen, 1984; Ingram 1984; Ingram and DeJong, 1987; Christiaens, 1991).  
Such incremental disclosure can occur through traditional hardcopy financial statements, and 
other media, such as Internet financial reporting. Therefore: 
 
H2:  There is a positive association between local authority leverage and the 
voluntary use of Internet financial reporting. 
 
3.4  Disclosure Incentives: Profitability 
 
Christiaens (1991) argued that ‘municipal wealth’ should be positively associated with 
increased disclosure because it provides a signal of management quality, which may benefit 
the local politicians by increasing their chances of re-election. Christiaens used ‘own revenue 
per capita’ as a proxy for ‘municipal wealth’.  However, net surplus may provide a more 
complete (but, by no means perfect) measure of managerial performance.  Studies of private 
sector entities have argued that managers will be more forthcoming with information “ … 
when the firm is performing well than when it is performing poorly” (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993, p. 248 - 249).  One explanation for this is that in such situations, management is keen to 
raise shareholder confidence and support management compensation contracts (Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Malone et al., 1993).  Poorer performing firms may avoid using voluntary 
disclosure techniques, such as IFR, preferring instead to "… restrict access to accounting 
information to more determined users" (Craven and Marston, 1999, p. 323).  The incentives of 
private sector managers would seem to be analogous to those of local political managers, who 
seek re-election, advancement, and/or pay rises.  Hence: 
 
H3:  There is a positive association between local authority profitability and the 
voluntary use of Internet financial reporting. 
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3.5  Disclosure Incentives: Strength of Press 
 
As discussed in Section 2, Zimmerman (1977) identified the role of the press in the agency 
relationship between voters and politicians.  Consistent with Zimmerman, Ingram (1984, 
p. 130) argues that a strong press “… might induce more disclosures to satisfy the information 
demands of the press or even as a defensive mechanism for politicians”.   
 
H4:  There is a positive association between strength of the press, and the voluntary 
use of Internet financial reporting by local authorities. 
 
3.6  Disclosure Incentives: Council Type 
 
The incentives for voters to demand information from regional councils would appear to be 
limited.  Rates charged by Regional Councils are considerably lower than those charged by 
territorial authorities.  The average annual rates income of regional councils for 1996-98 per 
capita was $62, compared to $449 and $448 for city and district councils, respectively.  
However, local political managers of regional councils have incentives to make voluntary 
disclosures of financial information via the Internet in order to discharge their accountability 
obligations under sections 223c and 223d of the Local Government Act 1974.  These sections 
require local authorities to operate in a manner that is open and comprehensible to the public, 
and to ensure that local communities are adequately informed about the activities of the 
council.  Regional councils have significantly larger voter populations and geographical 
boundaries than territorial authorities, as the boundaries of regional councils usually 
encompass numerous territorial authorities.  The Internet is a cost effective tool for 
disseminating information simultaneously to many individuals over large geographical 
distances.  Given the inclusive nature of this analysis, we do not assume a priori what the 
direction of the relationship between council type and Internet financial reporting practice will 
be. 
 
H5:  There is an association between council type and the voluntary use of Internet 
financial reporting by local authorities. 
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4.  Research Design 
 
There are 86 local authorities in New Zealand. These local authorities comprise 12 Regional 
councils and 74 Territorial authorities. The Territorial authorities consist of 15 City councils 
and 59 District councils. The website addresses of local authorities were identified through the 
Local Government New Zealand website <http://www.lgnz.co.nz>, Local Government Online 
<http://www.localgovt.co.nz>, and Local Government Web Site Index 
<http://www.oultwood.com>. Local authorities not listed on these three websites were 
contacted by telephone to obtain their website addresses, if any. 
 
Table (2) shows that 61 out of 86 local authorities maintain websites. All City councils 
maintain websites and 11 out of 12 (92%) Regional councils operate websites. The West 
Coast Regional council is the only Regional council that does not maintain a website. A lower 
proportion (59%) of District councils maintain websites. It could be argued that since 
Regional councils cover much larger geographical areas, the use of the Internet would be 
potentially more beneficial for them, especially where it enhances community access to local 
authority information. The prevalence of website ownership among City councils may 
symbolise the “urban factor” in Internet usage.  
 
Local Councils use the Internet to provide a wide range of information including social and 
community items, council history or background, news and announcements, environmental 
information and tourism or promotional information. Of particular relevance to this study, 
only 30 (about 49%) of local authorities with websites provide financial information on those 
sites. A higher proportion of Regional (54%) and City Councils (67%) in comparison with 
District Councils (40%) provide financial information on the Internet. Table 3 provides a 
breakdown of the type of financial information provided on websites. 
 
There are a number of practices relating to the display of financial information on local 
authorities’ websites. Some councils provide financial highlights, annual reports, or annual 
plans while other Councils provide combinations of these documents. The publication of 
annual plans only is the most common practice in providing financial information on the web 
with 47 per cent of the Councils use this mode. One-third of Councils provide combinations 
of the three types of financial information. 
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Table 4 presents the definitions of the research variables used in this study. Financial data for 
local authorities are collected from the financial information on the websites of local 
authorities (where available) and from hard copies of their annual reports and plans. The 
financial accounting data covered the three-year period 1997 to 1999. Press visibility is 
measured by the number of news items appearing in the print press and obtained from the 
electronic database Newsindex. Newsindex is New Zealand's most comprehensive database of 
contents of newspapers, journals and magazines published in New Zealand. 
 
The extent of Internet financial reporting is measured both as a dichotomous variable and by a 
disclosure index. The dichotomous measure reflects whether or not the local authority 
provides or does not provide financial information on the web. The disclosure index reflects 
the type and extent of financial information disclosed on their websites, as presented in Table 
3. The disclosure index (score) for a local authority is measured on a scale from 1 to 3.5. A 
Local authority disclosure index receives 1 point if it publishes its annual report or annual 
plan on the web and 1.5 points if it publishes financial highlights. The higher score for the 
latter reflects the fact that this information is not available in other forms of media, such as 
traditional hard-copy financial reports. Descriptive statistics for the index score for all local 
authorities are presented in Panel B of Table 5. 
 
 
5.  Data Analysis 
 
The aim of this study is to identify the determinants of IFR among local authorities in New 
Zealand. Univariate and multivariate analytical approaches are used. Preliminary data analysis 
is carried out to explore the latent characteristics of the data collected for the study. The 86 
local authorities are categorised into those providing financial reports on the Internet (IFRAs) 
and those not providing financial reports on the Internet (N-IFRAs). Table 5 (Panel A) 
presents descriptive statistics for the research variables for the two groups. Panel B of Table 5 
provides descriptive statistics for the disclosure index for local authorities that provide 
financial information on the Internet.  
 
Univariate independent sample t-tests are carried out on the independent variables for the two 
sub-groupings of local authorities to test for possible differences in the mean of the selected 
variables between IFRAs and N-IFRAs. Table 6 presents the results of the tests. 
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The multivariate regression analysis consists of two types of regression models. First, 
consistent with the two sub-grouping of the sample (IFRAs and N-IFRAs), the dependent 
variable is a binary measure. Logit analyses enable the estimation of the probability of an 
event's occurrence in relation to a number of measurable independent variables (size, surplus, 
leverage, local authority type and visibility in the local press). This estimation is used to 
ascertain the relative importance of these variables. 
 
An algebraic statement of the estimated model is: 
 
Υ i = α + Χ∑ ij β  + μ i          (1) 
 
where, for the ith local authority, 
 
 Υ  = the dependant variable (0 and 1 for N-IFRAs and IFRAs 
respectively) 
 α = the equation's intercept 
 Xj = the measure of the exploratory variable j 
 β  = estimate of the coefficient of the exploratory variable 
 μ  = stochastic disturbance term 
 
Expressed in its full form with respect to this study, the equation is: 
 
FinInfoi   =  α  + β1(Size)i + β2(Type)i + β3 (Surplus)i + β4 (Leverage)i  
 + β5 (Press)i +μ i        (2) 
 
where, for the  i th  authority,  
  
FinInfo  = IFR practice; 0 for N-IFRAs and 1 for IFRAs 
α     = the constant of the equation 
Size    = total rates revenue 
Type = dummy variable for type of local authority; 1 for Regional, 2 for City 
and 3 for District. 
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Surplus    = profitability ratio as per reported surplus 
Leverage = leverage ratio 
Press = Number of print media items 
μ  = error term 
 
The results of the multivariate regressions in equation 2 are presented in Table 7 (Panel A). 
 
Second, since financial information on the Internet includes a variety of reporting practices, 
the multivariate analysis is undertaken by using a disclosure index outlined the research 
design above as the dependent variable. A multivariate regression model is estimated: 
 
TypFinInfoi  =  α + Σβij1-5 + μi       (3) 
 
where, for the  i th  local authority,  
 
TypFinInfo = the dependent variable, IFR index score based on the type of financial 
information provided (1 point for web-publishing Annual Reports only; 
1 point for Annual Plans only; 1.5 for Financial Highlights) 
α     = the constant of the equation 
βj1 -  βj5 = observations for each of the six explanatory variables (Size, Type, 
Surplus, Leverage, and Press) as specified in Equation (1) above. 
μ  =  error term 
 
The results of the multivariate regressions in equation 3 are presented in Table 7 (Panel B). 
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6.  Results and Discussion 
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5 shows that councils that provide financial information on the Internet (IFRAs) are 
larger than councils that do not provide such information on the Internet (N-IFRAs). The 
mean rates revenue of IFRAs, at $33.3 million, is more than double that of N-IFRAs ($14.6 
million). The largest IFRA collected $121.2 million in rates, as compared to the largest N-
IFRA’s $89.9 million. This trend is repeated across alternative measures of size (not reported 
here) such as land size, total revenue and total assets. This preliminary result is similar to 
those reported by studies of IFR in the private sector (Ashbaugh et al, 1999; Oyelere et al, 
2000). 
 
IFRAs posted greater return on public equity than N-IFRAs. Their mean return on public 
equity, over the three years covered by this study, of 5.2 per cent compares to N-IFRA’s 
negative return of 3.1 per cent.  However, N-IFRAs’ mean return on turnover and total assets 
were greater than those of IFRAs. 
 
IFRAs are more highly leveraged, with long-term liabilities to total public equity ratio of 
0.11:1 as compared to N-IFRAs' 0.07:1. Similarly, their long-term liabilities to total assets 
ratio is greater at 0.08:1 compared with N-IFRAs' 0.06:1. 
 
IFRAs are more visible in the print press, with a mean press visibility count of 136 news items 
as compared to N-IFRAs’ 20 news items. The level of publicity experienced, however, varies 
significantly among IFRAs, ranging between a minimum of 1 news item and a maximum 814 
news items. N-IFRAs’ minima was nil, with a maxima of 161. 
 
6.2  Univariate Data Analysis 
 
The results of the univariate test (Table 6) indicate statistically significant differences between 
N-IFR and IFR local authorities on the bases of size, council type and press visibility count. 
IFR councils are significantly larger than N-IFRAs at the 1% level. This result is consistent 
with the findings of previous studies on the characteristics of local authorities (and their 
variants), confirming size as a determining variable (Baber, 1983; Evans and Patton, 1987; 
Christiaens, 1991). Similarly, at the 1% level, IFRAs are more visible in the press. This high 
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level of positive association between IFR practice and press visibility may not be surprising, 
given that both are media for communicating information, financial or otherwise, to the 
stakeholders of the local authorities. Ingram (1984) documents the significant influence of the 
press on financial disclosure levels of governments. Also at the 1% level, differences were 
found in the types of local councils engaging in IFR. The results of non-parametric univariate 
Mann-Whitney U test (Panel B, Table 5) indicate a strong relation between council type and 
the propensity to publish financial information on the web. This may have largely resulted 
from the relatively lower level of IFR practice observed among District councils as earlier 
reported. 
 
Differences between the two sub-samples of councils (IFRAs and N-IFRAs) are however 
statistically insignificant for profitability and leverage variables. IFRAs have a higher level of 
debt to equity and total assets. This is however not statistically significant across the three 
leverage variables used in this study. The higher level of debt may be related to the larger size 
of IFRAs councils. There is a subtle link between leverage and the need to use additional 
channels to make financial disclosures (Zimmerman, 1977; Baber, 1983). The evidence 
obtained from the univariate test in this study does not, however, support this position. Rather, 
it is consistent with the findings of a number of prior studies of disclosure in the public sector, 
where leverage and debt have been found to be not significant explanatory variables (Baber, 
1983; Baber and Sen, 1984; Ingram, 1984 and Christiaens, 1991). 
 
To summarise the findings of univariate tests carried out in this study, it is evident that, on 
average, IFRAs are significantly larger and more politically visible in the local press than N- 
IFRAs. Internet financial reporting practices among local authorities also appear to be 
significantly associated with type of council. No significant relations are, however, found at 
the 10% level or higher, between Internet financial reporting practice, and level of 
profitability and leverage, respectively. 
 
6.3  Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
Table 7 (Panel A) presents regression summary statistics for the estimates in equation 2 where 
the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure indicating whether a local authority provides 
or does not provide Internet financial information. Since a number of proxies are used to 
measure two of the independent variables, profitability and leverage, a number of 
combinations (models) are tested. The results of the estimation of two models are presented in 
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Panel A of Table 7. Model A incorporates surplus after tax to total public equity as a measure 
of profitability and long term liability to total public equity as a measure of leverage. Model B 
includes surplus before tax to turnover as a measure of profitability and long-term liability to 
total assets as a measure of leverage.  
 
Although both models have a high level of correct prediction of cases (75.6%), only one of 
the independent variables (Council type in Model B) is statistically significant. It appears that 
Internet financial reporting practices of local authorities cannot be predicted from traditional 
determinants used to partition other reporting practices in the public sector (Zimmerman, 
1977; Ingram, 1984) or the determinants of Internet financial reporting in the private sector 
(Ashbaugh et al, 1999). Across both models, expected positive relationships are found 
between Internet financial reporting practices, on the one hand, and both size and surpluses on 
the other. Albeit statistically insignificant, this is consistent with the findings of other studies 
examining Internet financial reporting in the private sector (e.g., Ashbaugh et al, 1999; 
Oyelere, 2000). It appears, from the results of this analysis, that council types, given the 
influence of the other variables considered, have statistically significant impact, at the 10% 
level, on whether local authorities provide financial information on the web. 
 
Both models are statistically significant at the 1% level. Model A accurately classifies more 
than 75% of the observations in the study. The results of its estimation indicate New Zealand 
local authorities’ IFR practices are positively related to surpluses, press visibility and size, and 
negatively related to leverage. Taken in the context of earlier univariate analysis above, it 
appears that these variables individually exert measures of influence on the decisions of New 
Zealand local authorities to publish financial information on the web. The usefulness of these 
observed influences as predictors of IFR practices is, however, weak when the variables are 
combined in a multivariate specification. The results in Model A are generally similar to the 
results in Model B.  
 
Table 7 (Panel B) presents regression summary statistics for the estimates in equation 3 where 
the dependent variable is measured by a disclosure index indicating the extent (quantity) of 
Internet financial information provided by a local authority. Similar to the analysis relating to 
equation (2) above, two alternative models A and B of equation (3) were specified. Across the 
two models, size and council type are statistically significant predictors of the extent of 
Internet financial disclosure by local authorities. Both variables are significant at the 5% level 
in the two models. Size is positively related to the level of disclosure, indicating that larger-
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sized local authorities are more likely to disclose greater amounts of financial information on 
the Internet than smaller councils. Also, council type (that is, whether City, Regional or 
District) is a significant predictor of IFR practice. 
 
On the basis of the results of these analyses, the hypothesis of a positive association between 
local authority size and the voluntary use of the Internet for financial reporting (H1) is not 
rejected. The result supports the notion of greater scale-related benefits with disclosure on the 
Internet, given the decreasing costs of information production and dissemination (Pirchegger 
and Wagenhofer, 1999). This finding corroborates those of studies on determinants of 
traditional hard copy disclosure practices in the public sector (Baber, 1983; Evans and Patton, 
1987; Christiaens, 1991; for example). It is also consistent with findings on determinants of 
Internet financial reporting practices in the private sector (e.g., Ashbaugh et al, 1999; Oyelere, 
2000). Size bears a direct relationship to monitoring and political competition (Baber, 1983), 
with agency costs likely to increase with size. The Internet, as an emerging electronic tool, 
offers a cost-effective disclosure medium for organisations. 
 
Similarly, hypothesis (H5) indicating a relation between council type and the voluntary use of 
the Internet for financial reporting by local authorities is not rejected. There appears to be a 
relatively greater incentive for some council type(s) to make additional financial disclosure 
than others. As discussed in the development of the hypothesis, voters may have less demand 
for financial information on Regional, as compared to the other Councils given the relatively 
lower rates charged by Regional Councils. It is apparent from preliminary statistical analysis 
that a greater proportion of City Councils (67%), than other types of Councils, provide 
financial information on the Internet. Perhaps more significantly, 40 per cent of these IFR 
City Councils provide a combination of types of financial information, ensuring a higher score 
for this category of Councils on the disclosure index. While the notion may be fast changing, 
there is still an element of “urbanisation” associated with the use of the Internet, and City 
Councils may be using such medium to lower their agency cost. Concomitantly, City Council 
executives, councillors and employees are also more likely to be in touch with the latest 
technological developments, with greater access to appropriately skilled personnel and 
consultants. While there has not been many studies incorporating Council type as an 
explanatory variable in public sector disclosure studies, Ingram (1984) found statistically 
significant relationship between urbanisation and the level of disclosure among US States. 
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No support was found for the three other hypotheses (H2, H3 and H4). It appears that there are 
no positive relationship between leverage, profitability and press visibility on the one hand, 
and the type and extent of Internet financial disclosure by local authorities on the other. The 
finding regarding leverage is not surprising. Apart from Evans and Patton (1987) and Ingram 
and DeJong (1987), the majority of prior studies on public sector disclosure reported 
statistically insignificant relation between leverage/debt and disclosure levels (See, for 
example, Baber, 1983; Baber and Sen, 1984; Christiaens, 1991; Ingram, 1984). 
 
Profitability, as measured by size-denominated surpluses in this study, is not a commonly 
used variable in public sector disclosure literature, given the non-profit nature of the sector. 
The use of the variable is justifiable in this study, given the alignment of New Zealand public 
sector financial reporting with that of the private sector. Profitability has been widely 
presumed and reported to bear a positive relationship to disclosure levels in the private sector 
literature (Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Malone et al, 1993; Cravens 
and Marston, 1999). It appears, however, that despite the alignment of reporting practices, 
profitability is not a sufficient motivation for local authorities to provide incremental 
voluntary disclosure through the Internet. 
 
A strong positive relationship was found between press visibility and IFR practices in this 
study. However, this relation is not sustained in the multivariate analysis. Hence, 
Zimmerman’s (1977) strong argument for the role of the press in the agency relationship 
between voters and politicians, and Ingram’s (1984) finding of a positive relationship between 
newspaper circulation and the level of disclosure among US States is not supported in this 
study.  
 
In summary, two of the hypotheses stated in this study, predicting a positive relationship 
between size and council type, on the one hand, and IFR practices on the other, are accepted. 
The type and extent of Internet financial disclosure by local authorities is significantly and 
positively related to their size and council type. The hypotheses postulating a relationship 
between IFR practices and leverage, profitability and press visibility are however rejected 
based on the results of multivariate analyses in this study. 
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7.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
Generally, the evidence regarding determinants of voluntary disclosure in the public sector is 
less conclusive in comparison with such evidence in the private sector. This is possibly the 
outcome of the limited research in the public sector as compared with the private sector. 
Further, the nature of public sector organisations, financial reporting practices and their 
agency relationships varies more considerably within and across countries in comparison with 
private sector organisations. The reform of public sector financial reporting in New Zealand 
where it is aligned with practices in the private sector and the development of the Internet as 
an information medium provides opportunities for the development of disclosure behaviour 
models in the public sector. 
 
This study examines the possible determinants of discretionary Internet financial disclosure 
practices by local authorities in New Zealand in the context of agency and other theories 
highlighting the incentives for voluntary disclosures in the public sector. Based on a review of 
the literature, hypotheses are developed regarding an expected association between Internet 
financial reporting practices and financial and other characteristics of local authorities.  
 
Results of statistical analyses indicate that IFRAs and N-IFRAs could be segregated, at the 
5% level or higher, on the bases of size, council type, and political visibility. However, only 
size and council type are significant in the multivariate analysis. Given the influence of other 
determinants, none of the variables identified in this study is a significant predictor in a 
strictly dichotomous partition of IFRAs and N-IFRAs. Taking the analysis further, by 
constructing a basic index score based on the type and extent of financial information 
disclosure by local authorities on their websites, size and council type were found to be 
statistically significant predictors. As in a number of previous disclosure studies, larger local 
authorities are found to voluntarily disclose greater financial information. Also, it is apparent 
that City Councils engage in more voluntary financial disclosure through the Internet than 
Regional and District Councils, possibly due to the “urban” nature of the Internet and access 
to it. This effect is likely to dissipate significantly in the near future. 
 
Three of the hypotheses stated in this study are not supported. No support is found for the 
hypothesised positive relation between Internet financial reporting practices and leverage, 
profitability and press visibility. 
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Future research opportunities include the refinement of a disclosure index for disclosure on 
the Internet that has not been included in other reporting outlets such as hard copy financial 
reports. The inclusion of other financial and non-financial variables such as management 
compensation and qualification may assist the development of improved predictive models of 
voluntary disclosure in the public sector. Such data was not available for this study. Future 
research may also consider examining the timeliness of disclosure on the Internet and how it 
compares with the timeliness of reporting in other media. This study is based on New Zealand 
practices; studies in other countries and international comparisons of determinants of IFR 
would be useful in the development of a comprehensive predictive model disclosure in the 
public sector in an electronic environment such as the Internet. 
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Table (1) 
Summary of Disclosure Studies in Public Sector 
 
Hypothesised Independent Variables 
Authors (year) Country 
Sample 
size Dependent Variable Type of Analysis Significant (p<0.1) Not Significant 
 
Baber (1983) 
 
US 
 
50 States 
 
State Audit budget (dollars) 
 
Univariate 
 
 
Multiple 
Regression 
 
Political Competition 
 
 
Population  
Political Competition 
 
 
 
 
 
Political intra-party 
Competition  
Debt 
Legislative size 
Wages 
 
Baber and Sen , 1984) US 50 States State adopt GAAFR funds 
definition 
Univariate 
 
 
 
Probit 
Political Competition 
Wages 
 
 
Political Competition (Inter-party 
competition) 
Wagesa 
Legislative Turnover 
Statutory restrictions 
 
Debt 
Legislative Turnover 
Statutory restrictions 
 
Political Intra-party 
Competition 
Debt 
 
 
Christiaens, (1991) Belgian 23 councils Compliance index Regression analysis Experience 
Consultants support 
Level of education 
Training per person 
Population  
 
Related parties 
Regional Treasurer 
Level of staff education  
Membership 
Business Experience 
Long-term debt per capita 
Own Revenue per capita  
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Table (1) Continued 
Summary of Disclosure studies in Public Sector 
 
Hypothesised Independent Variables 
Authors (year) Country 
Sample 
size Dependent Variable Type of Analysis 
Significant influence 
(p<0.1) Not Significant 
Evans III and 
Patton, (1987) 
US 444 cities GFOA Certificate of Conformance 
Program participation 
Probit (for two periods - for 1976-80 
and 1981-84) 
Form of Government 
Quality of management 
(CFO salary) 
Population (for 1976-80) 
Debt 
Professionally active CFOs 
GAAP State (for 1976-80) 
NON-GAAP state (for 1981-
84) 
 
Population (1981-84) 
Company town 
Political competition 
Quality of management 
(level of education) 
 
Giroux, (1989) US 167 cities Disclosure Index based on: 
1. pension and employee benefit 
disclosure  
2. operating budget format and 
disclosure 
3. statistical section disclosure 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis using 3 
different dependent variables 
Bureaucratic (simplicity 
index)b 
Monitoring (audit opinion)c 
Structural (GAAP required)d 
Structural (mayor/manager)c 
Median voter (avg. income)b 
Median voter (avg. tax price) 
 
Political competition 
(winning percentage) 
 
Ingram and 
DeJong, (1987) 
US 544 cities Disclosure Index OLS regression Non GAAP regulated 
Population Growth 
Federal Aid 
Form of Government 
(mayor, manager) 
Debt 
State Aid 
 
Population 
GAAP regulation 
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Table (1) Continued 
Summary of Disclosure Studies in Public Sector 
 
Hypothesised Independent Variables 
Authors (year) Country 
Sample 
size Dependent Variable 
Type of 
Analysis Significant influence (p<0.1) Not Significant 
Ingram, (1984)e US 50 states Disclosure Index  
1. 12-practice index 
2. 8-practice Index 
3. Logistics 
 
Multiple 
Regression 
Political Competition (index) 
Urbanisation 
Per capita income 
Appointive powers of governor 
Selection of accounting administrator 
Selection of Auditor 
News paper circulation 
Own revenue per capita 
Salaries (Governor and accounting) 
 
(all the above variables were concluded by the author to 
have relatively important explanatory power) 
 
Median School years 
Long term debt per capita 
Intergovernmental Revenue/ 
Total revenue 
Salaries (Legislator) 
Auditor-CPA 
Population 
Zimmerman, 
(1977) 
US 96 cities Length of annual reports and 
type of auditor 
Univariate Form of government (mayor, manager)  
 
Notes: 
a. In the Probit model Wages is significant only when Inter-party competition is omitted 
b. Significant under the budget index only. 
c. Significant under a statistical index only. 
d. Significant under a composite index only. 
e. Since this paper uses a variety of models its difficult to identify tested variables. 
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Table (2) 
Local Authorities’ Maintenance of Websites 
 
Type Regional Council City Council District Council Total 
 No. % No. % No % No % 
With website 11 92 15 100.0 35 59 61 71 
Without website 1 8 0 0.0 24 41 25 29 
Total 12 100.0 15 100.0 59 100.0 86 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (3) 
The Nature of Published Financial Information on the Internet (n = 30) 
 
Council type Total  
Regional City District No. of local 
authorities 
% 
Financial highlights only 1 - 3 4 13.3 
Annual reports only 1 - 1 2 6.7 
Annual plan only 1 6 7 14 46.7 
Combinations of annual reports, 
plans and financial highlights 
 
3 
 
4 
 
3 
 
10 
 
33.3 
Total 6 10 14 30 100 
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Table (4) 
Research Variables 
 
Variables Definition 
Size: Rates Average rate income 
  
Profitability:  
Return on public equity Surplus after tax 
Total public equity 
Return on total asset Surplus before interest and tax 
Total assets 
Return on turnover Surplus before interest and tax 
Turnover 
  
Leverage:  
Long-term liability: Total 
Assets 
Long-term liability 
Total Assets 
Total public equity: Total 
Assets 
Total public equity 
Total Assets 
Long-term liability: Total 
public equity 
Long-term liability 
Total public equity 
  
Press Visibility: Count Number of news items in the print press in which the local 
authority appeared during the period 1998 to 2000, as 
measured by a count search on Newzindex. 
  
Others:  
Council type Type of Local authority: 1=Regional; 2=City; and 3=District 
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Table (5) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Independent variables 
Variable Statistics All Local 
Authorities 
N-IFRAs IFRAs 
Size     
Rates Mean $20,796,944.93 $14,646,019.56 $33,326,607.70
 Std Deviation $24,177,332.39 $15,340,059.10 $33,004,204.59
 Skewness 2.197 2.835 1.214
 Minimum $244,602 $712,385 $244,602
 Maximum $121,163,000 $89,915,000 $121,163,000
 Percentile 25 $5,640,750.00 $5,268,021.00 $8,916,000.00
 Percentile 75 $23,680,769.25 $17,284,000.00 $56,148,000.00
Profitability   
Return on public equity Mean -0.0190 -0.0309 0.0052
 Std Deviation 0.2368 0.2829 0.0872
 Skewness -8.4210 -7.3260 -4.2610
 Minimum -2.0826 -2.0826 -0.4068
 Maximum 0.1102 0.0693 0.1102
 Percentile 25 0.0052 0.0018 0.0012
 Percentile 75 0.0188 0.0172 0.0346
Return on turnover Mean 0.0371 0.0751 -0.0404
 Std Deviation 0.3770 0.1601 0.6167
 Skewness -7.0910 0.7400 -4.9660
 Minimum -3.0835 -0.3974 -3.0835
 Maximum 0.6997 0.6997 0.3455
 Percentile 25 0.0150 0.0124 0.02261
 Percentile 75 0.1114 0.1187 0.0947
Return on total asset Mean 0.0049 0.0076 -0.0007
 Std Deviation 0.0473 0.0197 0.0782
 Skewness -6.7340 -2.0010 -4.6060
 Minimum -0.3790 -0.0929 -0.3790
 Maximum 0.0930 0.0516 0.0930
 Percentile 25 0.0013 0.0090 0.0448
 Percentile 75 0.0174 0.0173 0.0184
Leverage   
Long-term liability: Mean 0.0669 0.0621 0.0766
Total Assets Std Deviation 0.1236 0.1387 0.0866
 Skewness 5.4040 5.5400 2.9700
 Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
 Maximum 0.9668 0.9668 0.4361
 Percentile 25 0.0145 0.0140 0.0279
 Percentile 75 0.0742 0.0514 0.0880
Total public equity: Mean 1.0145 1.0584 0.9252
Total Assets Std Deviation 0.7219 0.8622 0.2591
 Skewness 8.3570 7.2610 3.5130
 Minimum 0.4328 0.6754 0.4328
 Maximum 7.2933 7.2933 2.0960
 Percentile 25 0.8865 0.9218 0.8437
 Percentile 75 0.9705 0.9726 0.9679
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Panel A continued: Descriptive Statistics - Independent variables 
Variable Statistics All Local 
Authorities 
N-IFRAs IFRAs 
Long-term liability: Mean 0.0808 0.0674 0.1081
Total public equity Std Deviation 0.1645 0.1499 0.1910
 Skewness 4.6830 5.0970 4.3210
 Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003
 Maximum 1.0077 1.0063 1.0077
 Percentile 25 0.0147 0.0147 0.0215
 Percentile 75 0.0804 0.0557 0.1004
Press visibility count Mean 60.69 20.29 136.10
 Std Deviation 145.46 33.56 225.48
 Skewness 3.912 2.8990 2.122
 Minimum 0 0 1
 Maximum 814 161 814
 Percentile 25 4.00 3.25 8.00
 Percentile 75 30.00 20.75 181.75
Others     
Council type Count 86 56 30
Panel B: Dependent Variable (Equation 2) Local authority IFR scores 
Statistics   
 Mean 0.5058  
 Std. Deviation 0.7765  
 Skewness 1.4270  
 Minimum 0.0000  
 Maximum 3.5000  
 Percentiles: 25 0.0000  
                   75 1.0000  
IFRAs = Internet financial reporting local authorities 
N-IFRAs = Non-internet financial reporting local authorities 
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Table (6) 
Univariate Sample Tests of Independent Research Variables for N-IFRA and IFRA 
 
Panel A: Sample T-Test of continuous independent variables 
Research Mean Difference Test Statistics 
Variable (Standard errors diff.) t-value Sig. (2-tailed) 
Size    
Rates -18,680,588.14 
(5,321,582.0) 
3.510 .001*** 
Profitability   
Return on public equity -0.0360 
(0.0558) 
-0.6447 .521 
Return on turnover 01156 
(0.0882) 
1.3103 .194 
Return on total asset 0.0083 
(0.0112) 
0.7479 
 
.457 
Leverage   
Long-term liability: Total 
Assets 
-0.0145 
(0.0292) 
-0.4971 .621 
Total public equity: Total 
Assets 
0.1331 
(0.1700) 
0.7830 .436 
Long-term liability: Total 
public equity 
-0.0407 
(0.0386) 
-1.0539 .295 
Press Visibility   
Press visibility count -115.81 
(30.60) 
-3.7850 .000*** 
    
 
Panel B: Mann-Whitney U Test of categorical independent variable 
Mean Ranks(Sum of Ranks) Test Statistics  
N-IFRA IFRA 
Mann-Whitney 
U Z Sig. (2-tailed) 
Others      
Council type 48.29 
(2704.00) 
34.57 
(1037.00) 
572.00 -2.969 .003*** 
*** = Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 7 
Multivariate Regression Results 
Panel A: FinInfoi = α + β1(Size)i + β2 (Type)i + β3 (Surplus)i + β4  (Leverage) + β5  (Press) + μi 
Model A Model B  
Research Variable 
Expected 
Sign Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Constant ? 0.0779 .939 0.1788 .862 
Size + 0.0001 .245 0.0001 .159 
Council type ? -0.5814 .106 -0.6277 .082* 
Surplus + 0.3213 .839 1.2051 .205 
Leverage + -0.3192 .864 -0.6943 .801 
Press + 0.0056 .199 0.0053 .204 
    
Log likelihood  85.05 82.15% 
Chi2 statistics  18.86*** 21.77*** 
Degrees of freedom  5 6 
Correctly predicted: N-IFR  94.5% 92.7% 
                                 IFR  37.0% 40.7% 
                               Overall 75.6% 75.6% 
 
Panel B: TypFinInfoi = α + Σβij1-5 + μi 
Model A Model B  
Research Variable 
Expected Sign
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Constant ? 0.8638 .011** 0.9058 .006*** 
Size + 0.0001 .050** 0.0001 .031** 
Council type ? -0.2353 .043** -0.2480 .029** 
Surplus + -0.0457 .891 -0.2440 .241 
Leverage + 0.0461 .927 -0.1370 .831 
Press + 0.0007 .276 0.0007 .314 
    
Adjusted R2  0.17 0.19 
F statistics  4.42*** 4.79*** 
*** = Significant at the 1% level, ** = Significant at the 5% level, while * = Significant at the 10% level. 
The proxies employed for the measurement of Size (Rates Revenue) and Council Type (Type of local 
authority, i.e. whether Regional, City or District) and Press (Press visibility count) are identical for the two 
alternative specifications A and B. Alternative measures used for the remaining two independent variables 
are: 
Surplus = Surplus after tax to Total public equity (Model A); Surplus before interest and tax to Turnover 
(Model B); 
Leverage = Long-term liability to Total public equity (Model A) or Long-term liability to Total assets 
(Model B). 
 
 
